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I. BEYOND SHEER SELF-REPRODUCTION AND AUTOPOIETIC CLOSURE
A basic conceptual lesson autopoietic theory teaches is to 
move from an input/output-paradigm to a paradigm of self- 
referential closure. Open systems theory with its focus on 
system/environment-exchanges, which became the most common and 
current taxonomic currency in social sciences over the last 
decades, should be overcome by a model of autopoietic self­
reproduction. While all versions of open systems theory - whether 
input/conversion/output-models or contingency-models - are 
associated with attempts at causal explanations and their 
inevitable failures in overly complex contexts, the notion of 
autopoiesis promises to grasp the fundamental self-reference and 
the very circularity of highly complex systems - and to 
reconstruct their closure and reproduction more properly.
Autopoietic closure, to be sure, should not lead back to 
traditional closed systems theory, anteceding the emphasis on open 
systems. Whereas the old approach focused on emerging system 
properties regardless of ambience and was fascinated by the 
discovery that "the whole is more than the sum of the parts", the 
new wave in systems thinking circulates around the idea that 
complex systems not only reproduce themselves but also their very 
self-generated elements. Structures, functions, processes, 
boundaries, environments, identities, absolutely everything down 
to the elementary units which cannot be further decomposed by the 




























































































Self-generation of elements does not imply the 
system's capacity to completely determine or control itself, as if 
the reproducing system existed without or totally apart from any 
environment. It only refers to the comprehensive production of all 
system units through recursive utilization of components already 
constituted. As system elements e.g. events or communications in 
social systems, are continuously vanishing, they are in permanent 
need of reproduction. Consequently, higher order (emerging) 
systems are no longer necessarily more complex than systems of 
lower order, which they use in constituting themselves.
Autopoiesis, thus, goes well beyond the concepts of "relative 
autonomy" and "self-regulation" in open systems theory. In all its 
versions, it shifts attention away from production and output, 
tocnsing on reproduction as the main point of reference. While 
theorists differ with respect to the modes of reproduction - 
Maturana (1982), for instance, concentrates on self-reproduction 
as such whereas von Foerster (1981) or Luhmann (1984a) assumes the 
necessity of a steering mechanism i.e. observation guiding self­
reproduction - they all focus on the self-organizing, that is, 
reproductive, aspects of temporalized ("hot") systems. But whether 
more essentialist as Maturana or more pragmatic as Varela (1981, 
who, incidentally, speaks of "autonomy" and "control" and not of 
"autopoiesis", the latter being a point of view besides other 
perspectives) or Luhmann's sophisticated recent dogmatism 
(heretically undercutting, as ever, established orthodoxy in order




























































































eminent preoccupation with self-reference, recurrence, 
circularity, open closure and reproduction.
Autopoietic closure in theory, certainly refers to itself in 
subtle and sophisticated ways, reproducing ever recurrent core 
beliefs in multiple versions with often brilliant arguments. 
Closure, for instance, is not just closure, but considered as a 
certain mixture of closure and openness; social systems e.g. are 
seen as "normatively closed but cognitively open". But what does 
this formula help us to understand? Normative closure and 
cognitive openness could, with regard to psychic systems, equally 
cover a "healthy", strong-willed but tolerant personality who 
simply knows what he/she wants as well as a pathologically 
paranoic, prejudiced person, curiously picking up whatever fits 
into his/her conspiratory world view. With regard to social 
systems, scientific and magic practices would equally reproduce 
themselves autopoietically as do bureaucracies, legal dogmatics 
and risky business decisions - normatively closed and cognitively 
open. But do not all the interesting differences lie in the 
specificity of the mixture of openness and closure and not in the 
mixture as such?
Autopoietic theory, as a scientific discourse, tends to close 
itself by opening itself up only to those phenomena which it is 
able to reconstruct and reproduce within its own premises - as any 
theory does. But if we all go in theoretical circles, as we 




























































































qualities) of the circle becomes the main distinguishing 
(redeaming) feature of the circular language game we are, nolens 
volens, reproducing. Under what circumstances, then, is a model 
focusing on reproduction worth reproduction?
Self-referential reproduction, it seems, is the more fruitful 
and stimulating an exclusive or ultimate frame or reference, the 
more abstract (and disinterested) our interests in understanding 
systems actually are. Most general questions of the 
differentiation or evolution, contingency or reflexivity, 
complexity or selection, integration or interpenetration of any 
one system and, therefore, system comparisons seem to be better 
served by autopoietic reasoning than analyses, say, of given 
historical formations; functionally specialized subsystems of 
modern societies (such as "the legal system") or "complex 
organisations" as such are better explained than the reproduction 
of "real phenomena" as, say, Nazi "justice" or the contemporary 
Japanese economy or the European University Institute as an 
educational and research institution.
The last examples already indicate that shifting the focus to 
reproduction as the central point of reference does not 
necessarily force us to ignore the different levels of production 
and output - and their contribution to different qualities of 
reproduction. On the contrary, system maintenance (which is, 
despite Luhmann, the core of reproduction) is usually compatible 




























































































these very differential qualities which are the main concerns in 
our daily lives. While theoretical reasoning can (and more often 
than not should) ignore everyday preconcept ions of problems, 
middle range theories of practical interest can and should not 
ignore everyday concerns in order not to become simply irrelevant. 
And it is hard to deny that most of us most of the time in most of 
our roles (including that of social scientist) are concerned with 
system performance and quality and only occasionally with sheer 
reproduction.
Often all we care is whether conferences or seminars are 
successful, stimulating, productive etc. or less so, and sheer 
continuation as success might be the lower borderline case of 
aspiration levels of reproduction (as, e.g. in the follow-up 
conferences of the Helsinki Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe). We prefer our own spouse over marriages 
like the one in "Who is afraid of Virginia Woolf?"; we prefer to 
Stanford or other "hot" colleges, rather than to any one. Public 
security or welfare provisions in Vienna are simply better than in 
New York. Pisa and Logan Airport, or the rapido between Milano and 
Roma and the Shinkansen between Tokyo and Osaka can hardly be 
subsumed under the same type of (airport, railway) service 
organization. In all these cases, it is almost only the 
differences in quality and system performance which count (and 
are, consequently, puzzles in need of explanation), whereas sheer




























































































But concern with quality and system performance related to 
reproduction instead of with sheer reproduction is not limited to 
vital or petty daily problems, from hospital care to love 
relations. Hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies in 
economics and social science try nothing but to understand the 
reasons for differential performance of contemporary British and 
Japanese industries, between Austrian and Dutch unemployment 
rates, between Swiss and Israeli monetary stability, between West 
German and American productivity increases; whereas the only 
irrelevant (though sometimes surprising) aspect is that all these 
national economies "reproduce" themselves in some way or 
another.Similarly, political systems are distinguished according 
to differential levels of freedom, civil liberties, democratic 
participation of citizens, government stability, levels of 
conflict or violence etc., and these differences in quality might 
be of more practical and theoretical interest than their sheer 
continuation or breakdown influenced by performance. But what do 
all these truisms imply for the initial theoretical puzzle 
concerning the circumstances under which a model focusing on 
reproduction is worth reproduction?
Autopoietic theory, in all its variants, tempts us to ignore 
the impact of system performance on system reproduction. While von 
Foerster or Luhmann leave space for processes of self-observation 
as necessary components of self-referential reproduction, they are 
unable to make even one single specific proposition as to how 




























































































reproduction (culturally variable, though not indefinitely, with 
regard to social systems). When Luhmann (1984b), for instance, 
talks about autopoietic self-reproduction of "the economy" as a 
functional subsystem of modern societies, he seems to be 
completely negligent of the simple but decisive fact that 
decentralized, private business or mixed market economies cannot 
reproduce themselves without growth; that is, a stationary or zero 
growth economy is impossible given certain institutional 
frameworks. But autopoietic reasoning about the economy in society 
does not allow understanding of this dynamic systemic quality of 
capitalist market economies, making extended, non-stationary 
reproduction indispensable for economic reproduction at all.
Obviously, this fundamental theoretical deficiency of self- 
referential reasoning becomes ever more accentuated, the less 
systems performance refers to inherent prerequisites such as the 
necessities of economic growth but to less categoric, binary, 
unsubstitutable and more gradual dimensions of reproduction. Here, 
the question is less how much trade imbalances, price 
instabilities, unemployment rates or productivity disadvantages 
are compatible with economic system reproduction at all than how 
different performance levels make not only for different forms of 
social (dis)integration but also for different modes of socio­
economic reproduction; one cannot be understood without the other.
In fact, if we do not look at results, that is, at the 




























































































process between input and output, the analytical distinction 
between production and reproduction stressed by autopoietic 
theorists becomes less sharp and clear anyway. System performance, 
to be sure, may mean dimensions as different as the attainment of 
goals proclaimed or the failure to reach them, latent functions 
fulfilled, or the quality of functioning itself, including process 
costs and process benefits produced as side products of daily 
performance, aspects quite independent of each other. An arranged 
marriage, for instance, might generate "love" or other emotional 
bonds instead of children, wealth accumulation or empire building 
as originally intended, and only the overall quality of the 
relationship will decide about its continuation or dissolution. 
More often than not, quality of performance will be the single 
most important dimension of reproduction.
Obvious problems in assessing this productivity (quality 
performance, output) of complex systems in no way decrease its 
fundamental relevance for systems reproduction, systematically 
ignored by autopoietic theorising. Standards of performance are 
always ambiguous (even experts can hardly determine what makes for 
"success" or "failure" in the performance of a police corps or a 
hospital organization); internal and external measures of 
performance are not necessarily congruent; yardsticks of judgement 
used might themselves change with changing norms in the systems 
environment etc. But however difficult to monitor and to assess in 
practice, systems performance will strongly influence 




























































































regulation, for instance, or macroeconomic management of an 
economy will, in the end, be continued or not, depending mainly on 
whether "it works" or not; the rest is ideology at best.
Using this last example, the following contribution argues 
that it makes an essential difference whether societal 
reproduction is "managed" and "governed" or not (part II); that 
the economic policy concertation necessary for macroeconomic 
management and governance typically takes the form of risky, 
highly precarious exchanges without the legal securities 
supporting analoguous business transactions. Examples of 
successful attempts at cooperative interest intermediation 
demonstrate that these practices constitute institutions without 
bureaucratic organizations, while inter-organizational 
transactions can be neither understood as political market 
relations nor be regulated by modern law and contract (part III). 
Part IV illustrates this non-legality of political cooperation in 
some detail with regard to a prominent case in point, part V 
discusses some functions of legal indeterminacy related to self­
referent ial ity or autopoietic self-reproduction of cooperative 
economic policy concertation, which could itself be interpreted as 
a substitute for law. Law, nevertheless, fulfills some secondary 
functions even within fundamentally non-legal networks of conflict 
regulation. This leads to the final query, whether the 




























































































exchange can fruitfully be interpreted as autopoietic regimes 
(without law), demonstrating long-term policy concertation as 
contracting relationships without contracts as well as mechanisms 
of coordination to be reduced neither to markets nor to 
(corporate, state) administration but as - highly improbable 
phenomena sui generis (part VI). As such, their logic of self­
organization and reproduction can meaningfully be interpreted by 
autopoietic systems thinking and some indications are given as how 
they could be modelled this way.
II. MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE, AND SOCIETAL 
REPRODUCTION
How is macroeconomic management of open, national economies, 
organized as mixed capitalist market systems, possible at all? Why 
and to what extent do some economic policies succeed and others 
fail with regard to maintaining acceptable levels of growth, 
employment and stability - and how come that the same economic 
programs and strategies succeed once while failing another time or 
in another country? And what conceptual tools and theoretical 
perspectives allow us to account for these differential 
macroeconomic performances and to explain cross-national 
differences as well as variations over time by a complex interplay 
between systemic socio-economic structures, political 




























































































Macroeconomic management of the economy might be considered 
successful inasfar as it prevents mutually reinforcing, cumulative 
disequilibria and systems disintegration; eventually leading to 
social disintegration, destructive political conflicts, 
institutional decay and disruptions of collective identities. 
Preventing cumulative disruptions in the economy, thus, is a 
crucial component of overall reproduction and development of 
advanced, industrial societies.
This capacity for societal reproduction and development, 
that is, guided growth shall be called governance. While 
governance obviously cannot be reduced to macroeconomic management 
of the economy, it clearly cannot do without it; even more, while 
macro-economic management of the economy is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of societal governance, I assume it to be the 
single most important element in explaining how social order is 
possible at all and what kind of changes are likely to occur.
In order to understand what makes macroeconomic management of 
the economy a problem of governance and governance a problem at 
all, some conceptual clarification is at first in order. A 
possible way of doing this is to gradually specify what 
governance, diverging from other established views is not, or more 
precisely, what it is also, but not exclusively or only 
predominantly. In this view, governance is not only ruling, 
control and domination, through repression or more sophisticated




























































































society. Whereas it always involves power, authority (Herrschaft) 
and attempts at reproducing privileged particularistic interests, 
that is domination, this concept of governance focuses on the 
relationship of dominant collective actors to historical projects 
and common goals - that is, on their dirigeance (Touraine 1973).
Similarly, other implicit views of governance will have to be 
complemented. First, governance cannot be reduced to the liberal 
conception of monitoring the unintended results of spontaneous 
mutual adaptation and self-regulation of independent corporate 
actors operating within a minimal set of rules governing otherwise 
"free" market competition (Hayek 1973). Neither can it be looked 
at secondly, as nothing but a process of continual muddling 
through by more or less intelligent adjustments, ad hoc measures, 
selective government interventions and other fundamentally 
undirected forms of incrementalism to securing socio-economic 
reproduction. Nor, finally, can we see governance as a 
problem of corporatist "institutional design" only, concentrating 
on political organizations and institution-building in order to 
extend governmental control and state authority by a network of 
interlocking, functionalised "private interest governments" 
(Streeck/Schmitter 1985).
While governance inevitably implies all these dimensions, it 
cannot be reduced to any or all combination(s) of them. In our 
understanding, governing implies also guiding/directing societal 




























































































historical projects or collective goals. Though reproducing 
domination as well as inducing social change almost unavoidably 
provokes defensive action as well as fundamental challenges to the 
very organizing principles (contestation) of societyi democratic 
governance (and that is what we are always talking about if 
talking of governance) has to be supported and collective goals to 
be agreed upon by a critical mass of those concerned by the very 
mode and outcomes of the developments induced.
Governance, thus, seen as the capacity of any given society 
for self-guidance and the steering of its most fundamental courses 
of action, is half way between the utopian technocratic claim to 
fully control even the consequences of purposive action (“anything 
can be done") and the counteracting neo-liberal resignation that 
“nothing is possible" in terms of political guidance except for 
withdrawal from economic exchanges proper. Contrary to that, one 
should think of the possibility that a society is reproduced, but 
not governed; If guidance/directive capacity is lost, socio­
economic reproduction is still possible (e.g. an “order through 
anarchy" as often stipulated for Italian society), but governance 
is not. (To be sure, in a rapidly changing world, reproduction 
without direction i.e ungovernability might well, sooner or later, 
dissolve social order and democracy also).
This guldlng/directive capacity of governance might diminish 
for several reasons. Whereas a large body of literature on 




























































































problems of blocked decision-making and implementation, procedural 
or task overload, loss of public confidence, popular support and 
legitimate authority in enforcing chosen public policies, little 
has been said (outside the armament and military domain) about the 
loss of guiding principles or former collective goals such as full 
employment. Abandoning full employment as an economic policy 
target, for instance, indicates a shrinking political will and/or 
a decreasing directive capacity - that is, a sensitive loss in 
overall governance. Though industrial societies with two-digit 
unemployment rates and three-digit inflation rates are still 
"possible" in the sense that "life goes on" in, say, contemporary 
Argentina, Israel, Yugoslavia, Great Britain or the Netherlands, 
they cannot seriously be called "governed" any longer as before: 
events "happen" and developments simply occur - and that is that.
Obviously enough, this conception of governance diverges from 
the prevailing notions of ungovernability at least in two 
fundamental respects. While many (neo-conservative as well as 
marxist) authors interpret ungovernability as an unintended and 
unanticipated consequence of all too ambitious political goals and 
all too naive and voluntaristic ideas of how to bring them about, 
I subscribe to an outcome-oriented conception of governance - at 
least with regard to macroeconomic management. Here, performance 
can be measured by agreed-upon yardsticks, and the different 
yardsticks and different degrees of consensus can themselves be 





























































































This conceptualization clearly reverses conventional 
assumptions, as can be illustrated with respect to employment 
levels as the single socially most important outcome of economic 
policies. Whereas in the traditional perspective a reduction of 
governmental responsibility for political goals such as full 
employment increases governability by shifting burdens, this 
contracting scope of governmental action by externalizing 
competences or shrinking directive capacities can be understood in 
itself as a symptom of diminishing governance (as much as it might 
improve the governing properties of the residual functions). 
Though I share the conviction that an intelligent delineation of 
boundaries for public and governmental action constitutes a 
crucial dimension of governability, the basic and most fundamental 
parameters of macroeconomic policies such as employment, price 
stability, growth rates, balance of trade and payments, exchange 
rates etc. obviously cannot be defined out of the game of 
governance without reducing the notion itself ad absurdum.
Yet, there is another reversal of conventional approaches. 
Instead of arguing (or even logically deducing) why an overload of 
public institutions and ungovernability seems almost inevitable or 
why macro-economic management of capitalist market economies is 
virtually impossible, this raisonnement focuses on how societal 
guidance and reproduction/governance is actually possible - at 




























































































III. ECONOMIC POLICY CONCERTATION: BEYOND MARKETS, BUREAUCRACIES 
AND LAW
Order from Concerts?
If social order in terms of guided reproduction i.e.
governance is possible at all, it does not arise from
(legislative) noise as von Foerster (1981) or Teubner (1985b)
would have it, but from concerts. Concerts seen as sophisticated 
networks of highly synchronised actions, more or less strongly 
programed but softly directed by subtle modulation only. Their 
performance is a complex ordering of complex performances.
Social order from concerts implies that macroeconomic 
management might be similar to a concert, but one performed 
without a partiture and an omnipotent conductor. In such 
circumstances, everything will be possible from chaotic noise to
genial free improvisation. But if it is nothing but these
differences between noise and free order which count ( for
reproducing the concerts), the main puzzle is what accounts for
the differences in successful concertation?
One factor - but a significant one - making a difference in 
economic policy concertation is a specific looseness or 
indeterminacy in coupling efforts of cooperation and in 
intermediating conflicting interests. The following contribution




























































































'structuration' (Giddens 1984), and more will be said about it in 
a moment. Before, three things should be clarified right from the 
start.
First, the very coordination needed to synchronise multiple 
and opposing actors' actions and interactions cuts out the 
spontaneous, natural emergence of policy concertation through a 
kind of "political market", compensating in the political arena 
for "market failures" in the economic realm and in harmonising 
antagonistic interests.
Secondly, the very looseness or indeterminacy in 
synchronising multiple and opposing actors' actions and 
interactions cuts out any strongly formalized device to cope with 
emerging complexities - that is, the possibility of setting up a 
bureaucratic apparatus (organization) controlling participants 
constituting the economic policy network or community; as well as 
to regulate their inter-organizational transactions and exchanges 
over conflicting claims by modern law, be it public law 
(authoritative state) regulation or civil law contracts by private 
parties.
Thirdly, this lack of bureaucratic and legal securities, the 
specific non-legality of networks of generalized political 
cooperation makes risky transactions even more risky, but, 




























































































concertation that it should be analysed as one logical 
prerequisite of productive joint policy-making.
If we look at existing cases of joint economic policy-making 
considered more successful than others, we always find some nuclei 
of coordination, perceived as the very "nerves" or brains of 
(self-)governance. These nodes, to be sure, are not parts or 
outlets of the central state, though governments or public 
administration might be represented within them; but even if 
central state agencies are present, they can just be important 
parties among others, not always superior or even hegemonic 
actors. On the other hand, there are networks of policy 
concertation, in particular on a subnational and transnational 
level (such as the private, international, sectoral 
restructuration circle in the European chemical fibre industry 
analysed by Kenis 1986), where state agencies are not even part of 
the decision-making community.
The nodes, thus, are no centers creating or determining the 
exchange networks and power-dependence relationships between their 
members, but serve as catalysts or crystallizing points to which a 
focal function in balancing the transaction-chain is attributed. 
Metaphorically speaking, they intonate the Leitmotiv followed and 
varied by the players bringing about an overall melody.But the 





























































































Obviously, all networks have nodes symbolically incorporating 
and representing a common vision of the policy circle and the 
corresponding operational projects around which all synchronising 
efforts are organized. This allows the development of binding 
orientations guiding concertation within the policy community and 
the communication of these orientations internally as well as to 
relevant, selected ("chosen") environments. Network nodes, hence, 
represent an indispensable collective institutional identity of 
the circle, directing collective action via self-projected images 
from a boundary-role, as if these intelligence/identity-nodes 
actually were centers of power and control.
Properly understood, the nerves or brains of policy networks 
organize the circle by organizing themselves (to paraphrase Piaget 
1947) more or less intelligently, a principle we could call auto- 
concertat ion. Catalysts of successful economic auto-concertat ion 
typically have no developed hardware (organizational structure) 
and software (interaction programs), and lack definite 
bureaucratic and legal forms.
This informality and indeterminacy of inter-organizational 
policy synchronisation will be shortly illustrated with regard to 
Japanese concertation, the success of which is almost unrivaled 
and certainly undisputed. But it could be even better documented 
for Swiss, Austrian, Swedish or Norwegian networks of intermediary 
interest intermediation in culturally closer contexts (Schmidt 




























































































those policy circles does not reach contemporary Japanese levels, 
it is still far above the OECD average, and the concertation
networks display the same characteristic looseness in coupling
#cooperative action and intermediating conflicting claims.
Some Japanese and European Evidence
Most powerful as they are, Japanese business interests 
exercise neither political influence nor macroeconomic hegemony 
directly through formal organizational channels. They have 
established, to be sure, a number of highly important business 
associations and developed a finely tuned division of political 
labor among them: the Federation of Economic Organizations
(Keidanren) representing all sectors of private big business as 
the dominant force; the Japan Federation of Employers' 
Associations (Nikkeiren/SCAP), a large employers' combat 
organization, mainly designed to counteract trade union impact on 
industrial labour relations; the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (JCCI), organizing mainly small business interests and 
recently compensating their historical weakness by mobilization 
efforts; and the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai 
Doyukai), a forum of progressive business, advocating in a 
business-dominated system what elsewhere is the function of 
tripartite, cooperative bodies: designing peaceful labour-
management relations, industrial democratization, government- 
business cooperation in a post-liberal, "corporatist",




























































































business within what a founding father called "amended 
capitalism".
But even within this club-like, salon-type organization, when 
it came to taking leadership in formulating most essential 
international economic policies as, for instance, the policy for 
capital liberalization or exchange rate policies, the Japan 
Committee for Economic Development set up an even more informal, 
small (ten-member) Industrial Issues Study Council (Sangyo Mondai 
Kenkyukai in short "Sanken") in order to most effectively concert 
divergent voices into an overall framework of policy orientation, 
to develop guidelines for internal coherence and comprehensive 
outside interest promotion.
As with international problems, local or regional issues are 
dealt with by quite formless committees, often created ad hoc. 
When, for instance, a comprehensive assessment of a planned 
seaside airport near Osakais expected from the regional business 
community, it is not Keidanren as the respective peak 
organization which responds top-down; instead, Kankeiren (Kansai 
Economic Federation, Kansei being the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto region) 
sets up a loose working group, composed of experts and 
businessmen, in order to evaluate and eventually program and 
coordinate the support for such a project bottom-up.
Similarly, inter-associational understanding and concertation 




























































































(zaikai-jin) and, as a second step, with government officials, is 
brought about mainly through informal circles. This should not 
easily be misinterpreted as nothing but the continuation of an old 
Japanese business tradition of informal networking for the 
particularistic interests of financial cliques (zaibatsu) or 
family clans (like Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo).
First, such an interpretation - as in the theory of state 
monopoly capitalism - cannot make sense of a whole series of 
business stands running counter interests of powerful (financial 
capital) sections or clans, but seen by the business class as 
being favorable in broad national, macroeconomic terms - e.g. the 
surprising preference for expansionary policies in the late 
seventies as against prime minister Fukuda's preoccupation with 
price stability.
Secondly, whenever tripartite bodies are assigned the task of 
intermediating between opposing interests of capital, labor and 
government; of initiating the formation of common outlooks on 
economic and social problems of general concern (energy, 
environment, welfare, education, transport, medial system etc.)? 
and of creating consensus around proposals elaborated in 
cooperation among the constituent parties - or simply of listening 
to other countries' experiences: all this is also done through 
rather informal networks - the Social and Economic Congress of 



























































































-  23 -
These few, sketchy m a r k s  sust suffice in this context to 
illustrate the core insight up to now: policy concertatlon as a 
prerequisite of aanaging nacroeconomlc performance and governing 
development typically takes no definite legal-organizational form. 
This indeterminacy has to be considered typical not just for 
Japanese macroeconomic management but for concertatlon as such, as 
it is to be found all over the place: from the (equally business- 
dominated) Swiss circuits organizing ‘Arbeitsfrieden* to the more 
labor-dominated Austro-Scandinavian coordination circles such as 
the Paritaetische Kommission in Austria, the Norwegian 
Kontaktutvalget replacing the former all to formal Oekonomiske 
Samordnlnqsraad and Kontaktutvalget or the Swedish Harpsund- 
conferences and the Planraad.
Significantly, such loosely integrated synchronisation 
networks are in no way restricted to national circuits (or even 
sure: to policy circles of small countries, as is often argued); 
they are also found more and more on international level, whether 
purely sectoral or comprehensive, whether privately coordinated or 
by public instances as the European Community institutions.
But, here again, the publicly spectacular European Tripartite 
Conferences after 1970 and the more institutionalized bodies such 
as the Standing Committee on Employment have proved less than 
successful. The Tripartite Conferences could not even reproduce 
themselves after 1978, stumbling over the transfer of a heated 




























































































Trade Union Confederation (DGB) represented by Heinz O. Vetter and 
the Confederation of German Industry (BDI), and in particular the 
council President Otto Graf Lambsdorff chairing the conference, 
over "reduction of working time" at European level, blowing up 
macro-economic synchronisation alltogether.
In contrast, informal policy circles such as the Steering 
Group set up 1976, the Val Duchesse Meetings since 1984 and the 
mechanisms created by the new commission strategy called the 
"Delors approach to European Social Policy" proved to be far more 
flexible, rapid and efficient in concertation than the publicity 
spectacles and "supermarket"-events of the Tripartite Conferences 
as well as the organizationally more formalized Standing or 
Advisory Committees. Why is this so and what does it mean?
Loosely Integrated Synchronisation Circuits
Quite obviously, synchronisation circuits are the more
effective, the looser and more indeterminate their internal 
coupling and the less binding and accountable their environmental 
effectiveness. The safest way to block and kill them would be the 
legalization (Verrechtlichung ) of inter-organizational exchanges 
and constitutionalization of their public control, as many 
"classical" corporatist attempts demonstrate, (the Sociafll- 
Economische Raad (SER) in the Netherlands being the most prominent




























































































an underlying norm regulating the risky transactions between the 
actors participating in policy concertation circles was coined as 
the unwritten rule of not writing down rules of cooperation, of 
keeping them ambiguous and revocable the pure opposite of formal, 
legal-contractual relations. Part V will elaborate on this 
further.
Does this imply that "everything goes" within these networks, 
leaving their functioning to the free play of forces operating 
within them? Or, on the other hand, if their transactions and 
outcomes cannot be properly understood by a mechanism of a 
political market, what else is it that holds together the chains, 
if not law and organization? And, last but not least, makes 
some synchronisation networks more and some less successful than 
others, in terms of sheer capacity of reproduction as well as 
their quality of performance?
While typically non-formalized, concertation practices are in 
no way left to themselves or accidental factors arising in 
unpredictable manner, but governed by complex sets of rules, 
allowing for internal selectivity and calculable effects to be 
attributed by their environments. Though they are more than 
random, casual, or purely singular encounters - as is often the 
case with "meetings", "conferences" or spectacular "political 
pacts" and "social contracts" - but regular arrangements, they 
almost never reach the level of organizational sedimentation: 




























































































statutes, finance, employees, written documents, authority 
structures etc. Hence, one could label them simply as institutions 
without organisation.
This lack of a bureaucratic apparatus has important 
consequences also for the "foreign relations" of policy networks: 
already the fact that they typically have no legal corporate 
personality of their own precludes the possibility of inter- 
organizational and inter-network transactions taking legal- 
contractual forms. As with regard to internal exchanges, cross­
boundary transactions must do without the securities of legally 
binding and contractual devices. Therefore, these procedures are 
often described as just "a way of doing" interest politics, guided 
by a specific "philosophy" and a "spirit" of cooperation.
Though making a good point by pointing to an important 
prerequisite of policy synchronisation, the stress on common 
outlooks and orientations can be grossly misleading. All too 
easily the impression arises that these circles are basically 
based on normative foundations: As if networks were held together 
by a kind of shared parsonian value-consensus. Obviously enough, 
this is generally the case neither in national or in 
supranational concertation circuits, given the fundamentally 





























































































If neither constitutions nor contracts, neither law nor 
organization, neither bureaucratic enforcement nor freely shared 
value consensus, what else holds networks of economic policy 
synchronisation together? And what else makes them more or less 
viable and their reproduction more or less productive?
Before we come back to provide some answers to these 
questions, the inherent non-legality of economic policy 
cooperation will be illustrated in some detail with regard to the 
juridical ambiguities of a prominent case in point of inter- 
organizational concertation.
IV. THE NON-LEGALITY OF POLITICAL COOPERATION EXEMPLIFIED
Juridical Ambiguities of Inter-Organizational Policy Circuits: 
The Parity Commission as a Case in Point
Nowhere is the formlessness (informality) and nonlegality of 
inter-association cooperation clearer than in the Austrian system 
of labour relations; and nowhere is the success bearing 
contradictoriness of the Austrian system of labour relationships 
more clearly shown than in the legal controversies about its legal 
bases and constitutionality. They condense and manifest the 




























































































legitimation, efficiency and control - and also the direction in 
which these oppositions are being resolved.
Almost everything about the Austrian "Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialpartnerschaft" (Economic and Social Partnership) (WSP) is 
legally ambiguous, from the central body of the Paritfltische 
Kommission" (Parity Commission) (PKPL , see Marin 1982a) to the 
dual character of its public law member associations and the 
demarcation of these chamber organizations from autonomous 
interest representation. Exaggerating slightly, one might even 
describe the gradual formation of institutions of 
interassociational cooperation in the postwar period as an 
ultimately successful process whereby the economic associations 
sought to set up their cooperation against all resistance, outside 
the constitutionally specified powers, but in practice legally 
unassailably. The question is how and why that was possible.
All the Parity Commmission's institutional predecessors after 
the Second World War were already constitutionally dubious and 
controversial. Between 1947 and 1951 a "Wirtschaftskommission*1 
(Economic Commission) concluded a total of five "Preis-Lohn- 
Abkommen" (Wage/Price Agreements). The "Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft" 
('Economic Commission') had no legal basis. Since it was 
subordinate to the federal government and constantly advised it, a 
constitutional codification would indeed have been necessary. For 
the Austrian legal system provides for assessment of relevant 




























































































(originally only by the Chambers). Accordingly, in order to 
legally justify the Economic Commission it had to be denied that 
it constituted a standing collegiate body of interest
representation to advise the government; arguing counterfactually 
that it had never met regularly, but in fact only case by case. 
Admittedly, even such a fictitious construction could hardly 
assuage the deep unease of leading legal scholars about the 
'Economic Commission' (1).
The next attempt by government and Nationalrat (corresponding 
the lower house of parliament) to get over the constitutional 
dubiety of the Economic Commission by setting up a legally covered 
''Wirtschaftsdirektorium der Bundesregierung" (Economic Directorate 
of the Federal Government) had, however, precisely the opposite 
effect from that intended. Instead of freeing the institution from 
the odium of being without the law and in the constitutional 
twilight, it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
Barely a year after the lower house had adopted the "Gesetz tlber 
die Errichtung eines Wirtschaftsdirektoriums der Bundesregierung” 
law setting up an Economic Directorate of the Federal Government
(2) , this was declared unconstitutional by the
"Verfassungsgerichtshof" (Constitutional Court), and abolished
(3) .
The Supreme Court decided that "the Economic Directorate of 
the Federal Government is to be regarded as a new, special 




























































































and thereby infringing the constitutionally exclusive 
respons'' bility of the "individual specifically competent Federal 
Ministers or the Federal Government". The freedom of decision 
given to the responsible Federal Minister by the constitution 
would thereby be abolished, "with the decision adopted appearing 
only in a formal sense as a decision of the Ministers whereas 
in fact it was one of the working committee... the competent 
Federal Minister must not however be impeded in the autonomous 
accomplishment of his remit by the need for approval from bodies 
not provided for in the constitution" (4). In accordance with this 
ruling of the Constitutional Court, the lower house abrogated the 
unconstitutional law setting up an Economic Directorate of the 
Federal Government (5). In place of the legally provided for but 
unconstitutional Economic Directorate there reappeared the 
Economic Commission, entirely without legal cover (6).
A subcommittee of the Economic Commission set up for price 
questions in late 1956 in turn developed in early 1957 into the 
"Paritatische Kommission fflr Preis- und Lohnfragen" (Parity 
Commission for Price and Wage Questions), or, initally, its price 
subcommittee. Its process of formation itself likewise illustrates 
the constitutionally dubious collusion of public and private 
power. The foundation of the Parity Commission is officially based 
on a decision by the council of ministers of the Austrian federal 
government of 12 March 1957. This directed at the four biggest 
interest associations - chambers and trade union confederation - 




























































































province to guarantee in the current year the maintenance of a 
stable price framework" (7).
The council of ministers referred explicitly to a report from 
the subcommittee of the Economic Commission, which , as everyone 
knew, had been set up on the basis of a personal agreement between 
the then federal chancellor and the president of the trade union 
confederation, at the latter's urging. The council of ministers 
session thus, as it were, ratified a private agreement between a 
top association official and a former association leader, now 
federal chancellor, by the elected federal government. The 
'support' for the government from the extralegal associational 
body went so far "that the Economic Commission not only prepared 
the text of the council of ministers' decision of 12 March, but 
actually wrote it" (8). Jurists regard this practice as a complete 
reversal of the constitutional provisions for at most the 
delegation of governmental tasks to interest representations.
In opposition to the principle of the rule of law and thus to 
the Bundesverfassungsgesetz (federal constitutional act), however, 
the federal government and federal ministry had increasingly 
become executive organs for interest group decisions arrived at in 
agreement between the associations. This had become glaringly 
obvious even with the five multilateral "Lohn- und Preisabkommen" 
(wage and price agreements) between 1947 and 1951, in which the 
Ministry of the Interior had in each case implemented the




























































































Economic Commission by simple decree. Later, in the legal dispute 
about the Economic Directorate, the federal government was even 
officially confronted with its own argument that it wished to give 
"the ...competent federal ministry only the role of the auxiliary 
apparatus carrying out the decisions, but in no way a 
decisionmaking function (9); though no mention was made of its 
own role as a kind of auxiliary apparatus of the economic interest 
associations.
Similarly, a bare decade later it was alleged against the 
plan for reshaping the Parity Commission that "while the Economic 
Directorate was to restrict the area of action of the Federal 
Minister for Trade and Reconstruction and take certain powers on 
itself, here by contrast the idea is that the Federal Minister for 
the Interior is to be destined for action" (10). Irrespective of 
whether the Minister of the Interior's role in a particular area 
of price regulation is interpreted as that of a "receiver of 
instructions from the Parity Commission", or the powers of 
sanction provided are interpreted as "general empowerment" of the 
federal minister - "the extension of price regulation, unavoidably 
necessary on the ideas of the reform plan for the function of the 
Parity Commission, is in both possible variants, in contrast with 
the federal constitution" (11).
It is therefore not very surprising that (mainly 
conservative) constitutional lawyers repeatedly proposed that the 




























































































legally to the federal constitution. Thus, the setting up of a 
parliamentary "Verbiinderat" (association council) or a 
“Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat" (economic and social council) (12) 
was repeatedly called for, whereas the authors of the Austrian 
constitution had still regarded as problematic the idea of a 
separate "Wirtschaftsparlament" (economic parliament) - thought of 
as “a body for appraisal and advice, possibly equipped with a 
suspensory veto" (13) of interest representation, side by side 
with parliament. But it is equally unsurprising that it is not 
Hans Kelsen's legal theoretical objections to the legal 
theoretical objections of conservative jurists, but vested 
political interests of the economic interest associations 
themselves, that have to date effectively prevented any attempt at 
constitutional "Verrechtlichung" (legalization) of the 
associational system and above all of interassociational 
cooperation.
The theoretical critique by legal scholars of the 
unconstitutionality of institutional arrangements of 
interassociational cooperation remained almost without further 
consequences after the episode of the Economic Directorate (14) - 
apart from the lesson learned by interest groups to keep their 
cooperative practices as informal as possible thereafter, thereby 
completely excluding formal legal verifiability. Instead of 
increasing possiblities of control over interest associations, as 
intended, the legal purism and formalism of the constitutional 




























































































cooperation into the legal twilight of complete informality, 
making it still less controllable; without its being in any way 
disturbed by the constitutional dubiety that had arisen. Nor had 
anything changed in the de facto position of equality or 
superiority of the "Economic and Social Partnership" vis-à-vis 
legislature and government in the Parity Commission either - 
except that the latter managed later to make itself completely 
independent and successfully protect itself from constitutional 
questioning from the outside.
An exception to this rule, which also confirmed it, was the 
Parity Commission's extension plans, incautiously published in the 
so-called "Raab-Olah- Abkommen" (Raab-Olah agreement) of 1962. The 
agreement was aimed among other things at expanding the PKPL's 
price control powers and sanctioning capacities, and for that 
reason alone was unrealizable in its original form, for 
constitutional reasons (15). Significantly, however, all 
subsequent bills on the "Preistreibereigesetz" (price fixing law), 
the "Preisregelungsgesetz" (price settling law) or the later 
reworked "Preisgesetz" (price law) (16) incorporated indirect 
powers of sanction for the four major interest representations in 
the form of a joint right of assessment and proposal. Government 
bodies - formerly the Minister of the Interior, now the Minister 
for Trade - can either only intervene officially if the economic 
associations manage to agree on exceeding the "usual local price", 



























































































-  35 -
changes in prices and wages as "economically essential". But 
unanimity can be attained by the associations only in the context 
of the Parity Commission, which is, like all its subcommittees, 
not provided for in any law, in any form.
The laws do mention agreement between individual interest 
representations as a requirement, but never the Parity Commission, 
the only thing that can be meant, since it is only in this 
institutionalized cooperation of the economic associations that 
unanimity can actually be brought about, on rules of the principle 
of concordance. By this deliberate ambiguity, the legislator 
prevents individual passages in the law being interpreted as a 
legal basis for the PKPL, which might lead to its abolition as an 
unconstitutional standing collegiate body.
The legal ambiguity is underpinned still further by certain 
irregularities in the frequency of convocation of the PKPL and its 
subcommittees, and the absence of organizational infrastructure. - 
finance, staff, secretariat, fixed meeting place, rules of 
procedure. According to political expediency, the legally required 
advice to government may one time come from individual economic 
associations, and another the lasting cooperation of interest 
groups and the state in the Parity Commission be emphasized - it 
takes on whatever legal appearance is needed.
With this legal indeterminacy and the indefiniteness and 




























































































unstable and questionable, though they might be unambiguous in 
themselves . To be sure, the given arrangements are voluntary 
agreements, so that the institution works praeter legem. By 
contrast with legally regulated administrative bodies, it has no 
administrative authoritative powers, no legal standing, no stages 
of appeal, no executive power. Since its constituent organizations 
were given the right to supply government, by agreement, with 
non-binding recommendations, it looks most like a kind of self­
management body, to which the state has transferred certain 
economic policy powers. This is all the more so since 
disappearance of this voluntary cooperation would require 
corresponding sovereign acts by parliament, government and 
administration. But the Parity Commission, legally considered, 
does not perform any sovereign functions by performing the social 
one of replacing sovereign action and rendering it superfluous. It 
is therefore all the more astonishing that even experts can regard 
it chiefly as an economic policy instrument of government (17).
How can the Parity Commission be an instrument of government 
when the majority of government members do not even take part in 
it, and some members of government, though they do, cannot vote or 
participate in decisions? How can the PKPL be a government 
instrument, when it is not only not bound by instructions (or 
could not, until 1966, block government interests) but cannot even 
form its opinion without paying any attention to them, while no 
federal government can fail to take account of unanimous decisions 




























































































This instrumentalist misinterpretation of the Parity 
Commission seems to be a direct expression of its hybrid legal 
position: it was set up at the explicit wish of the government, 
sanctioned by the council of ministers, and to date still operates 
with the participation of government members, without these having 
more than informal influence on the basically voluntary and 
private agreements of the leaderships of the associations. Advice 
to government from the economic associations, insofar as these can 
agree, is legally provided for? but the nature of the cooperation 
that is required and is brought about has been legally 
circumscribed and blurred. Undertakings entered into by the 
interest representations can be interpreted at best in private law 
as "Verwendungsgusagen” (promise of intercession) (18), binding 
the economic associations only as commission members with voting 
rights? since legally they bind neither government nor member 
associations (e.g. specific trade unions, sections of chambers) 
nor association members, de facto both the collective bargaining 
powers of the individual trade unions and the price fixing 
possibilities of the firms represented are certainly restricted 
(19). Although additionally interassociational cooperation in the 
PKPL represents the last instance for central economic policy 
decisions and thus has, by contrast with other countries, 
significance in upholding the system, this de facto sovereign 
function is, as it were, legally denied: public-law regulations 
exist for only one part of the participant organizations (the 
chambers) and there in turn for precisely those areas lying




























































































The multiple legal ambiguities continue in many ways at the 
level of the constituent economic interest associations in the 
Parity Commission. For instance, the Chamber organizations are 
legally provided representations of classes and social groups, 
with the public law status of self-managing corporations. As such, 
in their "eigenen Wirkungsbereich" (own area of action), they have 
to represent the interests of chamber members vis-à-vis the 
State? but by contrast, in the "iibertragenen Wirkungsbereich" 
(transferred/delegated area of action), to implement the States' 
instructions to its members, as an auxiliary organ of the public 
administration. But these two areas of action, clearly separable 
in legal theory, in practice unavoidably overlap; all the more so 
since the legally regulated dual position of the chamber 
oganizations vis-à-vis the State supervisory authorities is 
overlain by numerous informal, counter-structural arrangements 
between government apparatus and economic associations - in the 
context of the Parity Commission and in that of non-autonomous 
participation of associations in public administration.
Thus, the Chambers have, for instance, special rights of 
application, proposal and in some cases even a special right of 
voice vis-à-vis the organs of the legislature and executive; in 
practice of the WSP, however, in addition to this expert function, 
they frequently exercise de facto a right of legal initiative, in 
no way allowed to them by law. The same is true of the 
delimitation of Chamber organizations from the autonomous or 




























































































distinction becomes blurred into unrecognizability in the practice 
of the Austrian associational system. Individual "free" interest 
associations provide*for compulsory membership (20); the largest 
among them (trade union confederation and league of 
industrialists) perform tasks legally reserved to the Chambers, or 
delegable by these, including the conclusion of collective 
agreements (21); finally, there is such a multiplicity of 
organizational and personal interpénétrations between politically 
parallel autonomous economic interest associations and Chambers 
that the area to which particular decisions have to be assigned 
can probably hardly be kept apart any longer even by the actors 
involved, still less by outside observers.
There are organizational interpénétrations with ambiguous 
legal consequences at all levels and in all associations. Three 
examples picked out may serve to confirm this : in the realm of 
business organizations, for instance, the "Hauptverband der 
Qsterreichischen Sparkassen" as a "free" interest representation 
also handles the tasks of the "Fachverband der Sparkassen", the 
corresponding savings banks professional association in the 
mandatory "Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft" (Federal 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce). The "Prâsidentenkonferenz der
Landwirtschaftskammern" (Conference of Chairmen of Chambers of
Agriculture) (as, for instance, also the Federal Conference of
Chambers of the Liberal Professions) is a "free" interest 
representation, even though the "Landeslandwirtschaftskammern"




























































































central association, like the Austrian Raiffeisen association as 
an auditing association, are entirely compulsory organizations; 
these compulsory associations in turn recognize, however, in some 
federal provinces, "free" interest representations as subordinate 
specialized organizations. In the Chambers of the liberal 
professions, "free" interest associations and Chamber 
organizations come together in the same peak association. In the 
organizations of the labour movement, again, for instance, the 
"Fachausschtlsse der Kammern ftlr Arbeiter und Angestellte" 
(specialized committees of the Chamber of Labor) are almost 
identical with the specialized suborganizations of the trade 
unions. And something still more complicated and more 
systematically permeating all levels of the associational system 
are the personal interconnections, whereby officials of the 
Chambers at the same time occupy positions in "free" interest 
associations, and vice versa, and these links are then further 
interwoven with political interest organizations. Especially in 
agriculture, this kind of "Filz" ("tangle") is in no way an 





























































































V. LEGAL INDETERMINACY, IMPLICIT "CONTRACTING WITHOUT CONTRACTS", 
AND SECONDARY FUNCTIONS OF LAW
Before we can analyse the functions of the specific looseness 
and juridical ambiguities of successful intermediary interest 
intermediation set out above, its fundamental aspects will have to 
be clarified; that is, the basic dimensions of legal indeterminacy 
will have to be determined: What does legal indeterminacy of 
inter-organizational policy circuits actually mean in analytical 
terms, abstracting from the wide variety of related empirical 
phenomena?
A first and general feature is a permanent shifting of 
boundaries defining the transaction network of the policy circuit. 
In trying to characterise this looseness by a loose and 
nevertheless catchy formula, it was once called the unwritten rule 
of not writing down the rules of cooperation (Marin 1985b, 110); 
of keeping exchanges always somewhat open and revocable - but not 
arbitrarily and only limitedly so. By implication, while few 
strategic options are kept open, the specific modalities of 
actually delivering precommitted generalized compliance can 
usually be renegotiated.
The rationale behind this bounded informality is binding the 




























































































agreements or renegotiating the terms of cooperation which turn 
out to be problematic; thereby successively overdetermining 
informally what remains formally underdetermined. This is brought 
about by combining little or no legal formalization and 
bureaucratic organization with high interdependence of structures 
and effects of joint actions, make for a blurring of distinctions 
of the coordinating circle and its environment and corresponding 
re-internalization of short-term externalities. The resulting 
constant redefinition of domains and ambiguity of cooperative 
arrangements provides a strong institutional defense-mechanism and 
an almost inexhaustible source of autonomy and control. 
Autopoietic theory would speak of operational closure and self­
referent iality.
The less formally structured and externally accessible 
cooperative networks are, the more they can handle environmental 
attributions and influence if not create their public images. 
Inaccessability blocks off outside interventions, Gestaltlosigkeit 
is in continual need of interpretation and, thus, generates 
opportunities to project one's own self-conception onto relevant 
others - at least as long as crucial knowledge is appropriated and 
converted into superior powers of definition and accumulated 
legitimacy. Generally, obliterated boundaries are not designed or 
produced purposefully and there is no blueprint for optimal 
hazyness and legal ambiguities; but once they have come about, 
they are skillfully manipulated and increasingly developed by a 




























































































drawing of boundaries, that is, responsibilities, just where they 
are needed at times. In order to bond policy networks efficiently, 
their boundaries must be shifting to the extent that tasks are 
moving and power-relations changing - and that is almost 
permanently.
But bounded informality, most important in itself, is not the 
only constitutive dimension of legal indeterminacy; the fictions 
of open exit and limited liability are equally important. In the 
literature on inter-associational concertation, the first aspect 
is discussed as the fundamental "voluntariness" of cooperation. 
Yet, the formal freedom to cooperate or not has a complement in 
the formal limitation of binding commit ments to the (minor!) 
explicit aspects of encompassing and necessarily incomplete 
agreements: Without both the voluntariness and the presumed 
specificity of transactions, implicit contracting would not be 
possible. But while these fictions have to be treated as 
realities, they are, in reality, pure counterfactuals: Mostly, 
only locked alternatives and diffusing responsibilities can 
explain why interest organizations conform to accords without 
formal treaties and how "social contracts" hold without contracts 
and in the absence of legal sanctions.
Open exit means that, in principle, overall cooperation could 
always be left, if not terminated, by any single participating 
organization and regulative principles or specific activities 




























































































the rules of compromise such as unanimous decision-making are, in 
the last instance, revocable and therefore voluntary. The exit 
option is always open in principle, but difficult and remote in 
practice: The possibility to quit looses all edge if not used as 
an ultimate threat or sanction of adversary coalition partners 
against each other only. Ironically enough, so much voluntariness 
turns itself into an iron necessity to go on collaborating, if 
exit from cooperation becomes ever more costly with ongoing 
cooperation. Exit, then, develops into a face-saving device for 
short interludes at most, whereas the contracting parties to the 
policy network find themselves ever more "locked into" an alliance 
which has become valuable in itself by the sheer amount of "sunk 
costs" or specific past investments in maintaining the 
relationship.
Open exit, thus, is a most stabilizing fiction as it 
transforms the persistent formal freedom to cooperate or not into 
a far more compelling force to hold on than written contracts or 
legal sanctions ever could; while at the same time denying the 
gradual very transformation of voluntary exchanges into compulsive 
continuity of transactions. This way, the indeterminacy of 
voluntary transactions is gradually determined and overdetermined 
by a growing stock of informal mutual obligations and confidence, 
interwoven utilities, reciprocal trust, political credits for 
reliability and faithfulness and corresponding reputations at 
stake etc., and bonds develop in a silent, creeping, even self- 




























































































The very same applies to the fiction of limited liability» 
The more specific, limited, and revocable any single concession 
within a framework of generalized compliance seems to be, the 
easier it will be done and the better it can be enforced 
internally by all participating organizations. But while illusions 
of reversibility and careful delineation of compromises increase 
the willingness to make them, their very interlinkages and 
"nesting" within a multiplicity of related issues actually allow 
only for minimal desertion and refusal of responsibilities never 
explicitly taken. The abundance of tacit assumptions and of 
implicit agreements over explicit ones is a direct consequence of 
the transformation of short-term "deals", "pacts" and "treaties" 
into more long-term, multiplex relations between interdependent 
actors, held together by antagonistic cooperation.
The relational nature of contracting between divergent 
interest organizations "concerted" by some synchronising policy 
task results from the fundamental incompleteness of all complex 
and workable agreements. Complex agreements must be incomplete in 
order to be viable, but if they are incomplete, they are basically 
trouble-ridden and ultimately unenforceable; while strictly 
enforceable "social contracts" either do not work or, if they 
work, are not useful, as precise risk assessment and contingency 
planning would erode them from all substance.
Implicit "contracting without contracts", in contrast, suffers 




























































































initially diffuse and ill-defined and become precise through 
permanent and controversial contextual specification only; hence, 
concessions, information, consensus, support, membership control, 
and other valuable forms of compliance exchanged always remain 
somewhat ambiguous and unspecific even where monetarized 
measurables are part of the performance offered; structural, and 
i.e infinite interdependence of interests make for no clear 
beginning and end, that is, no well-defined duration of the 
agreements, which are continuously adjusted; the non-inter­
interchangeability of the valuables transacted allows for a very 
restricted transferibility of jointly produced outcomes only and 
binds participants of the alliance to the emerging system, making 
their self-interests more and more coextensive with that of other 
adversarial collaborators; trouble-shooting over conflictual 
interpretations of tacit assumptions becomes routine and 
corresponding collective tension-management is a permanent 
necessity in order to specify anew and in ad hoc fashion the 
generalized commit .ments to comply to rules which are neither 
exhaustive nor definite.
In short, the implicit elements of the agreements in need of 
continual re-interpretation and re-negotiation are not only 
abundant but also at the very core of the "social contract"; the 
seemingly "non-contractual" elements of the contract are the very 
essence of it. The practice of recurrent antagonistic cooperation 
they induce is a process of trust-generating re-contracting and 




























































































closed and independent of outside influences. In the last part, 
we will come back to this growing autonomization of generalized 
political exchange networks and see whether it can meaningfully be 
interpreted as a tendency towards autopoietic closure.
Several implications of implicit contracting without 
contracts should be pointed out explicitly. First, in highly 
developed, complex, "centerless" societies, only decentralized 
rule enforcement structures are viable in regulating the 
collective self-regulation of policy circuits. Enforcing implicit 
inter-organizational agreements can almost never have recourse to 
the Leviathan. Such a world of limited sovereigns or hegemons (if 
there are at all), where the central state cannot prevent powerful 
public and private actors from cheating, defecting, double­
crossing, free-riding and other forms of violation of agreements 
by opportunistic moves, is found in modern international trade and 
foreign politics or in organized crime as it is in ancient, 
stateless, "primitive" societies - and these are the fields from 
which collective self-organization can learn most as to how to 
overcome problems of strategic interaction and to provide 
decentralized social control.
Obviously, the detailed modes of decentralized rule 
enforcement cannot be elaborated here. It should be evident, 
however, that rational actors will forego strategic opportunities 
only in exchange for something - be it mutual insurance against 




























































































responsibility for policy outcomes, for fear of retaliation, loss 
of reputation in future transactions or systemic effects of 
precedents firing back on themselves. Generalized rule compliance, 
in order to become a rational self-interest of all collective 
actors involved, must be based on close mutual monitoring and 
sanctioning capacities, generated by high structural 
interdependencies and corresponding vulnerability of overall 
network stability and performance.
Secondly, this dependence of the overall exchange network and 
its governance potential in particular on the rule compliance of 
any single participating actor has a series of structural 
implications. Again, the structural prerequisites of successful 
cooperation can neither be enumerated nor elaborated, but some of 
them are obvious enough to indicate the direction. Empirically, 
they are found in all cases of well-functioning policy 
concertation. Participation is for instance highly restrictive, be 
it in terms of a limited number of actors, be it by exclusion of 
actors not either highpowered themselves or with direct access to 
controlling agencies. Parties to the agreement are sufficiently 
unified and in control of their constituencies as to guarantee 
membership acceptance of compromises with other organizations. 
They dispose of comparative advantages in administrative 
rationality and organizational intelligence vis-à-vis competing 
but excluded actors, providing high information-input, 
professional expertise, continual co-presence to permanently 




























































































decisions throughout the whole policy cycle. Domains are 
comprehensive in order to allow a series of interlinked 
specialized little deals within the overall contracting framework 
on which the divergent interests of an encompassing alliance 
converge, etc. Given these and many other preconditions of viable 
implicit political contracts, it is not surprising that the 
emergence of workable policy concertation is rare? and once it 
emerges, its working remains always precarious and prone to 
collapse. Contracting without contracts is, in evolutionary terms, 
highly improbable an achievement.
Thirdly, while the agreements which hold together policy 
networks cannot be framed as binding legal contracts, they rarely 
do completely without legal underpinnings. Neither the political 
market nor state bureaucracy (or other hierarchical organization) 
can absorb the uncertainties inherent in risky political exchanges 
- and nor can law; but as the former, modern law reduces some 
transactional risks of complex policy synchronisation. Without 
being sufficient or only necessary an element of workable 
arrangements, law often contributes to functioning cooperation and 
performs helpful secondary functions in interest intermediation.
Saying so does not, to be sure, imply a systems functionalist 
conception of law, rather the opposite. For conceptualizing law 
just as binding rules and regulations for solving conflicts of any 
sort by stabilizing expectations is so abstract a view that 




























































































including implicit, apriori inexplicable and not even minimally 
legally enforceable "social contracts".
The reality of contracting without contracts, instead, 
displays two distinctive characteristics. First, though inter- 
organizational agreements cannot be handled by legal devices and 
remain fundamentally inexplicable with regard to future 
committments, they often formulate some core obligations in quasi- 
contractual form as "treaties", "political pacts", "social 
contracts", "grand bargains"; that is, they use contractual forms 
as political symbols without effective legal securities. Secondly, 
they often use legal resources in the strict sense of the term to 
fall back on when they have to enforce the legally not binding but 
politically obliging inter-associational agreements within their 
own organizational domain - just think of price or collective 
labor law underpinning the non-legal cooperation in the Austrian 
case analysed above. This contrast between formless, non­
bureaucrat ic and non-legal cooperation between organizations and 
legally highly regulated internal spheres has often been observed 
(e.g. Lehmbruch 1984), but never fully explained. It cannot be 
done here either.
Instead, two different secondary functions of law, 
corresponding to the different uses just distinguished, should be 
kept in mind. Legal regulation of the (internal) environment of 
contracting parties makes law serving as a kind of fail-back 




























































































implementation and execution of policy agreements settled ex ante 
without legal securities; whereas the contractual symbolism often 
used to frame some explicit core components of largely implicit 
and necessarily incomplete “social contracts" mainly serves as a 
political signalling device, to state mutual claims of compliance, 
to integrate images of common policy orientations and to 
strengthen elements of goal congruity. Modern law, thus, is 
neither an indispensable ingredient of policy concertation nor 
does it guarantee that political "pacts" will be observed or 
violators will be penalized; it might, nevertheless, perform some 
latent and secondary functions just by its very (partial) absence, 
indeterminacy or background operation only.
VI. GENERALIZED POLITICAL EXCHANGE AS AN AUTOPOIETIC REGIME BEYOND 
LAW?
In another context, I have analysed the working of policy 
networks as precarious transaction circuits of generalized
political exchange (GPE, Marin 1985a). Now, we have just seen that 
risky political exchanges take place without the legal-contractual 
securities of equivalent business transactions. But how, then, 
does successful policy concertation work and even reproduce itself 
over time? If legal autopoiesis does not play a role in 
reproducing policy circuits, what are its functional substitutes? 
Given their legal indeterminacy, could GEP-networks themselves, 




























































































conceptualized as autopoietic regimes (without law)? And if so, 
how is their basic self-referentiality brought about and 
maintained, despite the absence of legal dogmatics and 
institutions and in the absence of political markets and 
bureaucratic hierarchies?
I think, in fact, that political transaction-chains and 
networks can fruitfully be interpreted by autopoietic systems 
thinking. In what follows, some indications will be given as to 
how they could be modelled this way, without fully elaborating 
them. The argument starts with the premise that the fundamental 
self-referentiality and autopoietic self-reproduction of 
generalized exchange circuits directly springs from their legal 
indeterminacy. Consequently, they develop a circular, self- 
referential code of special communications outside the legal 
system and the general polity. They are socially closed. Their 
environments are self-constructed, with symbiotic relations with 
privileged interlocutors. They operate on self-generated, stable 
expectations, among which the disposable time and an autonomous 
time order might be the most valuable of all self-produced 
resources. They develop autonomous decision-processes, free of 
state regulation, government interventions and administrative 
controls. Boundaries are thematically defined, highly domain 
selective, but comprehensive. To the extent that concertation 
networks develop a collective identity of their own, as a policy 
community transcending the corporate identities of participating 




























































































or legislation. Finally, it makes sense, as will be seen, to speak 
of GPE-networks as normatively and communicatively closed, but 
informationally open.
Let us now develop three of these elements of autopoietic 
self-reproduction one step further, starting with the last item. 
What does communicative closure and informational openness of 
policy circuits actually mean? First, it leaves behind Luhmann's 
(1972, p 40 f.) dichotomy of learning vs. self-assertion, 
cognitive adjustment vs. powerful insistence on norms given, by 
combining both of them: Concertation networks learn within the 
limits of predetermined frames. They continuously learn and have 
to, keeping collective brains open to acquire operational 
knowledge, as long as what they know is compatible with the 
premises of communicative closure; otherwise, "half-knowledge" 
prevails (Marin 1981).
Communicative closure has two distinctive aspects. With 
regard to participating actors, it means a tendency towards social 
closure once an exchange network has been established. This 
propensity to closure will be the stronger the longer transactions 
have been going on within the circle, allowing each contracting 
party to specialize its significant contributions beyond the 
levels originally envisaged and to gradually monopolize certain 
assets. Furthermore, social closure of the network increases with 
given, structurally fixed interdependencies (as in the case of 




























































































over time. But growing social closure simultaneously makes for 
more open time horizons, to the extent that "endless" mutual 
dependence is also projected into the future. Social closure, 
thus, corresponds to structural interest lock-ins and 
interdependencies, and relatively stable political aspirations 
over time; only within such a stable framework is an opening-up of 
time horizons, a permanent adjustment to moving tasks and goal re­
specification, i.e. haggling over the precise terms of implicit 
contracting without contracts possible and productive.
A second aspect of communicative closure has to do with the 
procedural forms and the policy contents of recontracting, the 
Sachdimension: Many items cannot be negotiated at all, and 
whatever is negotiable must be framed highly selectively and 
recontracted according to a complex operational code, whereby the 
rule systems used cannot simultaneously be renegotiated 
themselves. The problem is that the rules of the game can be 
reconstructed ex post reasonably well, but, apart from the most 
obvious and least contested ones such as decision rules 
(concordance vs. majority vote) they can seldom be sufficiently 
specified in advance; they are, as the late Wittgenstein (1958) 
taught us, to be learned only by living, exercising, following 
them.
Hence, their fundamentally circular nature; Games are 
basically self-referential, but their rules are not always




























































































somewhat indeterminate. It is this residual indeterminacy which 
makes them totally self-referential, by an endless regress: Rules 
of the game ^eferring^0 ruies Qf the game referp̂ nG to rules of the 
game; and collective actors increasingly caught in this 
autopoietic self-reproduction of a cooperative regime. The less 
legal codification, the more self-referentiality through self­
generated cultural codes - a certain, almost undefinable "spirit" 
or "philosophy" of cooperation.
Codes of this kind crystallize a kind of dogmatic core of 
basic interests and corresponding goal functions, procedural norms 
of recontracting implicit agreements, relevant facts and guiding 
outlooks and policy orientations. They can hardly be strictly 
consistent, but they persist over time. Yet, while they also tend 
to persist, to close and to reproduce themselves by self­
referent iality, their autopoiesis becomes (in contrast to legal 
autopoiesis) never self-sustaining - as underlying interest 
divergences, continuous cleavages and antagonisms, power shifts 
etc. never allow for complete functionalization.
This is exactly the point where autopoietic systems 
reasoning, as any general, pure theory, comes to its limits. It 
can analyse, in functional terms, the working of concertation 
networks and what makes them work - as long as they do so. But it 
cannot, within its own model, determine what makes indispensable 
rule systems or integrative codes passed on, changed or given up; 




























































































and why; in short, what makes autopoietic closure closed and self­
reproduction reproducing itself. In contrast, it does not even 
allow for autopoiesis not going on. While this might make some 
limited sense in analysing law an sich, it ceases to be a 
meaningful premise the very moment complex systems are studied 
within their time-space contexts and that their simple 
reproduction also depends on their productive performance and its 
political assessment - as economic policy circuits certainly do.
At this point, autopoiesis cannot be simply assumed any 
longer, but must be reconstructed; nor can it be supposed to be a 
binary code, there or not, but a matter of degrees, the 
determination of which is an open empirical question; nor can it 
reduce the collective actors (constituting games which 
simultaneously constrain them) as nothing but agents performing 
system reproductive functions. Instead, a new set of analytical 
notions, focusing on the interplay of action and system aspects 
(such as "market hierarchies", "tangled hierarchies of implicit 
contracts", "self-modifying games", "antagonistic cooperation", 
etc.), should lead to a series of related, but different 
theoretical puzzles and queries for empirical inquiry (Marin 
1985a). For, without empirical studies, theorising about the 
viability of policy circuits will remain behind its potentialities 
and unfounded. Pure autopoietic theory will have to be modified 
and complemented by empirical research in order to generate more 
sound and grounded theory about the specific conditions, 




























































































transaction networks reproduce themselves - and definable 
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FOOTNOTES FOR THE CASE ANALYSIS (Part IV)
(1) See, Cor instance, Adamovich, L., Spanner, H., Handbuch des 
Osterreichischen Verfassungsrechts, 5. Aufl., Vienna 1957, p. 
124
(2) See BGB1. Nr. 104/April 1951, w.a. int Institut fflr angevandte 
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung, Haterialien zur Sozlal- und 
Wirtschaftspolitik Heft 2, Zur Paritfltischen Koanission fflr 
Preis- und Lohnfragen, Vienna 1966, p. 131 ff
(3) See Erkenntnisse des Verfassungsgerichtshofes vom 17. Juni 
1952, Slg. 2323, w.a. in: ebda, p. 133-138
(4) The Constitutional Court became involved in the application of 
the provincial government of Vorarlberg, which suspected 
unconstitutional legal arrangements in para. 3(1) of the 
"Aussenhandelsqesetz" (Foreign Trade Act) (BGB1 No. 105/1951), 
linking the decisions of the Minister of Trade to the reports 
of the working committees of the “Wirtschaftsdirektorium" 
(Foreign Trade Advisory Council) or of the “Economic 
Directorate"; rightly, as it later turned out.“ It was 
therefore the task of the Constitutional Court to verify 
whether the restrictions layed down in para. 3(1) of the law 
on the constitutionally specified powers of the competent 
federal minister to be supreme and autonomous head of the 
federal administration within his province are compatible with 
the federal constitution or not.
For this purpose, a position had first to be taken on the 
constitutionality of the provision of para. 3(l)(a), which 
says that the Federal Ministry for Trade and Reconstruction 
issues permits in its own sphere of action, insofar as it is 
in accord with the report of the working committees of the 
Foreign Trade Advisory Council. This provision in no way gives 
the working committees of the Foreign Trade Advisory Council a 
merely advisory function - as one might initially conclude 
from the term advisory council; by it, they are not bodies 
whose opinion merely constitutes an expert report for the
responsible minister, not binding in law. Instead, the
minister is empowered to issue the permit only if he agrees 
with the report by the competent working committee. This 
report is thus given constitutive importance, which removes 
the free right of decision given to the responsible federal 
minister by the constitution and makes the decision adopted 
appear to be a decision of the minister only in a formal way,
while in reality it is one of the working committee. The
working committees thus act as collegiate bodies called upon 
to decide in a matter for the highest federal administration. 
The creation of such bodies or their involvement to handle 
tasks of the highest federal administration, through simple 
federal enactment, is however incompatible with Art. 69 (1) of 
the federal constitution, since it unconstitutionally 
restricts the exclusive power of the competent federal 
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them laid down in the constitution or by enactment - for the 
overall guidance of the federal administration, embodied in 
the constitution.
What is said here about the power given the federal committees 
by para. 3 (1) (a) to perform tasks of the highest federal 
administration must apply equally to the power of decision 
explicitly given the economic directorate by para. 3 (1) (b),
ibid., p. 136.
(5) By the federal law of 27 May 1952 (BGB1 No. 112/1952). The
"Economic Directorate" continued, despite the ruling of the 
Constitutional Court, to exist for the while, since its 
recognition did not refer directly to the law setting it up 
(BGB1 No.104/1951). Thus, the federal law (5. leg. cit.), 
which had in any case as a precaution been given a time limit, 
could simply be allowed to expire by not renewing it on 30 
June 1952.
(6) "One is tempted to assume that the initiators of the "Economic 
Directorate" had been guided, among other things, by more or 
less conscious reminiscences of the authoritarian, corporate 
constitution of Austria of 1934 but that constitution had 
"preparatory organs", among them a "Bundeswirtschaftsrat" 
(Federal Economic Council). Neuhauser, G. p. 270; it is put 
still more harshly by Adamovich, L. Handbuch des 
Osterreichischen Verfassungsrechts, op.cit. p. 110, who 
focuses on actual effects rather than possible motives; "but 
the 1934 corporate constitution sought to achieve a way of 
legal order but did not actually achieve has been brought 
about in recent years through actual developments."
(7) Institut ftlr angewandte Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung, 
loc.cit., p. 155
(8) See Neuhauser, G. loc.cit. p. 74
(9) Institut ftlr angewandte Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung, 
a.a.O., p. 137
(10) Sozialwissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft (SWA), Der Plan 
zur Umgestaltung der "Paritatischen Kommission ftlr Preis- und 
Lohnfragen" vin 27. Dezember 1961, Rechtsgutachten Nr. 24, 
Vienna 1962, p. 10
(11) SWA, loc.cit, Vienna 1962, p. 13. On the first 
interpretation, it would be Article 69 of the federal 
constitution that was infringed; on the second 
interpretation, Article 18 (1). It is typical of the formal 
legal mode of thought that PKPL members have to be brought 
into consideration as "the individuals summarized under the 
functional term 'social partnership'" (ibid , p.8). From a 
sociological viewpoint this way of looking at the social 
reality and effectiveness of the "social partnership" can, 




























































































fiction, the function of which lies in the legitimatory 
confirmation of the reality it denies. Just as far from 
reality, because it is normative, is the jurists' objection 
"that the draft denotes the Parity Commission as 'organ of 
the social partners'. The federal government members 
represented in it can however in no way be regarded as 
representatives of the 'social partners', since they ... are 
under an obligation to the whole federal population, from 
which, according to Article 1 of the federal constitution, 
the law of the Austrian Republic proceeds" (Ibid. p.7). Apart 
from the fact that this criticism has become even legally 
inappropriate with the loss in the interim by government 
members of voting rights in the PKPL - so that this has now 
in fact become an "organ of the social partners" - probably 
even the most naive legal theoreticians could have expected 
from their objections not any change in the reality of the 
PKPL, but only its self-denial, and the disguising of the 
aspects complained of by appropriately shifting the labels. 
They have thus attained the exact opposite of their intention 
of making "the social partnership" more transparent.
(12) See Klecatsky, H., InteressenverbAnde und Parlamente, ins 
Rummer, K. (Hg.), Die VerbAnde und ihr Ordnungsanspruch , 
Vienna 1965, pp. 23ff o 7* Schambeck., H., 1st der mode m e  
Staat ein StAndestaat?, in. ebda, pp. 48ff bzw. ders., 
Kammeroganisation und StAndeordnung, ins Im Dienste der 
Sozialreform. Festschrift ftlr Karl Rummer, Vienna 1965, pp. 
443ff
(13) Kelsen, H., Das Problem des Parlamentarismus, ins Soziologie
und Sozialphilosophie. Schriften der Soziologischen
Gesellschaft in Vienna, Bd. Ill, Vienna 1919, pp. 19ff
(14) "It is beyond doubt that this mode of procedure avoided many
differences and protected Austria in the difficult years 
after the end of the the Second World War from otherwise 
inevitable upheaval through economic struggles. On the 
other hand, it cannot be denied that the procedure used 
contradicted the federal constitution's intentions by
shifting the decisive political decision making from the 
lower house, as the forum to which it should be solely 
reserved, to a body which is in reality one of
representatives of economic interests, though admittedly also 
strongly politically influenced". Adamovich, L., Handbuch des 
ttsterreichischen Verfassungsrechts, loc.cit., p. 124.
(15) SWA, loc. cit., Vienna 1962
(16) The (legal price-regulating machinery) originally consisted 
of the "Preistreibereigesetz" 'price-rigging act' (BGB1, No. 
92/1950), amended in 1958 (BGB1. No, 107/1958) and the 
"Preisregelungsgesetz" 'price-regulation act' (BGB1 No. 
151/1957), a reenactment of the frequently, on average more 




























































































91/1950). Following the 'Raab-Olah-Agreement' the price­
rigging act (BGB1 No. 104/1962) and the price-regulating act 
(BGB1 No. 103/1962) were simultaneously amended by removing 
the collaboration of the interest representations in a 
temporary official price fixing from the price-rigging act 
(extension of para. 1 (3)) and providing for it in the price­
regulating act (para 3 (2)). Further extensions of the
possibilities of sanction came especially in the price 
regulating act amendment 1971 (BGB1 No. 488/1971) and 1974 
(BGB1 No. 804/1974), and in the price act 1976. Moreover, 
these shifted the initiative for price policy sanction 
measures to the Federal Minister for Trade, Commerce and 
Industry; the authorities can no longer fix official maximum 
prices on the basis of unanimous agreement of the major 
interest associations (price regulating act 1957 , para. 3a), 
but on the other hand their agreement is now necessary in 
order to block a procedure autonomously started by the trade 
minister (pursuant to para. 3b of the price regulating act 
amendment 1974 or para. 4 of the price act 1976 which 
replaced it). Moreover, their are other possibilities for the 
economic associations to activate official price regulation - 
for instance through the "Parit&tischen Ausschuss fttr 
Kartellangelegenheiten" (Joint Committee for Cartel Matters).
(17) "The conclusion is that the Parity Commission ... has more
the nature of an executive organ, an instrument of government 
economic policy, and less that of a self-managing body with 
economic policy powers, since no economic policy decision­
making of its own is done in the Commission. The Commission 
merely carries out the economic policy decisions of the 
government, carrying on price and wage policy in the form of 
a 'voluntary self-control of prices and wages' as a means of 
implementing anti-inflation policy . Neuhauser, G., loc cit., 
p. 108. This assessment has been outdated if only by the 
autonomization of interassociational cooperation, after the 
government members who continued to take part in the meetings 
of the 'Parity Commission' abandoned their voting right in 
1966 - and therewith their possibility of vetoing decisions 
of the economic associations. Futhermore, the reasons they 
give show precisely how much a formalist approach can seduce 
even so-called experts into a misapprehension, indeed a 
reversal, of reality, when the author states in all 
seriousness: "the Parity Commission has above all the nature
of an economic policy instrument, because it was founded 
officially at government request" ibid, loc.cit., p. 107.
(18) ABGB, a third ed. Munich 1976, p. 157: "para. 880a. (promise 
of intercession; promise of effect) If someone has promised 
another person a performance by a third party, this counts as 
a promise of his intercession with the third party; if 
however he has promised the result, then he is responsible 
for full satisfaction if the performance of the third party 




























































































(19) Collective agreements are therefore legally interpreted not 
only on a private-law basis but also on a public-law one or 
in terms of a 'social guardianship'. For differing legal 
views, see for instance Federal Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce (ed.), Probleme der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen 
Selbstverwaltung, Vienna 1967.
(20) Meishl, P., Kammern und freie Verbànde in der Landwirtschaft,
ins Ptltz, Th. (ed.)r VerbUnde und Wirtschaftspolitik in 
Osterreich, Berlin 1966, p. 261, names as an example the 
asociation of Austrian tobacco planters: "Since 1954
membership has been compulsory for all holders of a tobacco 
growing licence for the growing season concerned ...", since 
tobacco growing is subject to the monopoly act and licences 
are obligatory. Nussbaumer, A., in: ibid, adduces the
Austrian Raiffeisen association and the Austrian association 
of cooperatives as examples of de facto compulsory membership 
in "free" associations, and describes their mechanisms of 
action as follows: "The position of the private interest 
association (Austrian Raiffeisen association), like that of 
the associations in the savings bank and trading cooperatives 
sectors, is strengthened by its close connection with the two 
compulsory associations, the association of credit
cooperatives on the Raiffeisen system in the context of the 
chamber organization, and the association of auditors. 
Pursuant to the audit act in its 1936 version, every
cooperative must be associated with an association of
auditors; to be sure, a Raiffeisen bank might also choose an 
auditing association of the people's banks, but there exists 
a standstill agreement between the two associations of
cooperatives which means on the one hand that an individual 
cooperative cannot evade effective auditing by changing its 
association, and on the other also strengthens the 
association's position vis-à-vis its members. This threefold 
position of the association leads even in the case of the 
free association to compulsory membership, not de jure but at 
any rate de facto" (p. 665). "The Austrian association of 
cooperatives has according to its constitution a dual
position. It is an association under the associations act 
1951 , BGBl No. 233/51 and at the same time an association of 
auditors within the meaning of the act of 10 June 1903, RGBL 
no. 133, on the auditing of trading and economic 
cooperatives. Besides this it de facto performs the third 
function of doing the tasks of the specialized association of 
the federal chamber of industry and commerce. Since in the 
case of the association of auditors and the specialised 
association membership is prescribed by law, there is de 
facto compulsory membership even in the free association, 
because, though auditing by the organization of agricultural 
cooperatives is permissible, it is contractually excluded by 
the standstill agreement between the organizations of 
cooperatives, and even the accession of a new cooperative can 
take place only via the associations. The association thus 
covers all cooperatives that may come into question for 




























































































(21) The "Kollektivevertragsgesetz" (collective agreements act) 
"Bundesgesetz vom 26. Februar 1947 flber die Regelung von 
Arbeits- und Lohnbedingungen durch  ̂ollektivvertrâge und 
Arbeitsordnungenw (Federal act of 26 February 1947 on the 
regulation of conditions of work and wages by collective 
agreements and labour ordinances, BGB1 No. 76) provides this 
by law in para 4. In most other cases such a cession of 
powers takes place through agreements and interlocking 
offices, that is the occupation of several functions by one 
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